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Abstract
According to Silicon.com’s CIO Insight – Beware the Insider Security Threat, insiders are bigger
threats to corporate security than external threats such as denial of service attacks or malware.
Statistics show that 70% of fraud is perpetrated by staff and that the main data security threat
comes from poorly trained or disgruntled employees who are authorized to have access to data
and file stores [4]. This research project focuses specifically on the problem of insider threat in
relational database systems. The project involves simulating research conducted in Qussai
Yaseen and Brajendra Panda’s research paper, Predicting and Preventing Insider Threat in
Relational Database Systems. The objective of this project is to develop the knowledgebase for
an insider as they request access to attributes in transactions. The generated knowledge base for a
given user or insider is then used to develop a Threat Prediction Graph that can be used to predict
and prevent insider threat.
Generating the knowledge graph and threat prediction graph, which will issue warnings if
insiders have the ability to infer values of data items to which they do not have authorized
access, provides an effective solution to the insider threat problem in relational database systems.
Conducting this test across different relational database schemas gives an idea of how long it
takes to obtain unauthorized knowledge of data items for various types of relational databases
and reveals which areas are most susceptible to insider threat.
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1. Introduction
The objective of this paper is analyze the process of providing a simulation of the solution
proposed in Qussai Yaseen and Dr. Brajendra Panda’s paper Predicting and Preventing Insider
Threat in Relational Database Systems. The underlying premise that led to this study was that
insiders caused 52% of breaches in 2004, more than the number of external threats posed to
companies and organizations [5]. Security issues are becoming increasingly crucial, especially
with regard to ensuring the protection of data from “interruption, modification, and fabrication”
[1]. While extensive study has been done in preventing outsiders’ attacks and increasingly more
research has gone into the issue of insider attacks, there has been relatively little study in
comparison to handle the issue of insider threat in relational databases. An insider has authorized
access and privileges but can pose a threat by violating the security policy of the system through
legitimate information access. This occurs through information that can be inferred from existing
knowledge of other system units. Consequently, insider threat in relational databases is primarily
influenced by the dependencies that exist in a given database.
The paper by Yaseen and Dr. Panda investigates the problem of knowledge acquisition by an
unauthorized insider using dependencies between objects in relational databases. In proposing
solutions to prevent insider threat and access to information, the paper introduces mechanisms
such as the Constraint and Dependency Graph (CDG) and the Dependency Matrix that are used
to represent dependencies and constraints between objects [2]. Based on these graphs, an
insiders’ knowledge graph can be constructed to show the knowledgebase of a user. The
simulation that is the primary objective of this paper, takes the methods and process proposed in
determining the dependencies and constraints to determine threats and prevent access to
confidential information by unauthorized users.
The first step in predicting and preventing insider threat in relational database systems is to
determine the dependencies that exist between data items. This is because insider threat in
relational databases depends mainly on the dependencies that exist among tables. Dependencies
as defined in this report are semantic relationships that exist among attributes. This goes beyond
typical functional dependencies although it includes them. Determining dependencies within the
4

context of primary keys and foreign keys are the first step in creating the Dependency matrix.
However, tracing the dependencies also requires a conceptual understanding of the schema that
includes understanding business rules and regulations of a given organization. Dependencies are
used as they tend to change infrequently. Few changes occur to the table structure, moreover,
once the business rules have been established and the data model is created. As a result, mapping
the dependencies and constraints among tables provides a reliable and consistent way to trace the
threat conditions and sensitive information that exist for any given database.
For the purposes of this paper, the example database schema used is that of a generic Payroll
System. The constraints and dependencies that exist in the data model are used to generate the
Dependency Matrix, which in turn will be used to construct the knowledge graph of the insider.
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2. Background & Motivation
Research was conducted on insider threat in relational database systems to prevent “insiders
[who] may use their privileges or knowledge of various system units to infer about other system
units to which they lack access” [1]. The primary goal of the research outlined in Yaseen and
Panda’s paper was to identify a strategy to predict and prevent insider threat in relational
database systems by keeping track of a given users’ overall knowledge acquisition. The
strategies were developed in such a way that unauthorized access to information could be
prevented without affecting the overall productivity of a given user.
Through the knowledge graphs, the amount of information that an insider can infer can be
determined. This in turn can assist system administrators in determining an effective balance
between the security and sensitivity of a transaction requested when they assign user
permissions. Assigning permissions are critical in protecting the security of any system,
including relational database systems. Being aware of the security issues that exist and having an
idea of the threat prediction graph will allow administrators to assign permissions more
efficiently. Consequently, users can maintain high productivity levels as they experience fewer
rejected transactions.
The simulations that are the primary focus of this paper serve the purpose of identifying the
critical areas for security breaches in a relational database system based on the dependencies and
constraints that exist among tables for a given database. By running the simulation,
administrators will have a better idea of how best to assign permissions that allow users access to
all necessary information but prevent them from being able to infer unauthorized information.
The multiple variables that can be manipulated in the simulation from the number of users and
transactions to the number of data items being accessed allow administrators to test multiple
scenarios of user access to the database. This information can be used to determine the best
balance between enough access to data that is vital to productivity and too much access to
sensitive information.
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The Payroll System was used as the data model for the example database schema as it provides a
system that contains several instances of sensitive information. Moreover, the Payroll database is
likely to be found in a similar form at any organization or company and thus provides a model
that can be easily understood and applied. The schema also offers multiple, fairly obvious
dependencies and constraints among the tables which proved to be extremely useful in going
through the steps of creating the Constraint and Dependency Graph (CDG) and the Dependency
Matrix.
A second generic schema was produced through random generation. The generic schema showed
that the simulation can be executed on any database schema, provided the dependencies and
constraints that lead to the acquisition of sensitive information for the schema can be obtained.
The generic schema differs from the Payroll schema in that it contains fewer overall attributes
and consequently has fewer threat conditions. Having the second schema provided the
opportunity to compare the two schemas against each other and determine how differences in
constraints, dependencies, and threat conditions affect the overall knowledge acquisition and
threat potential posed by a given user.
The simulations were run under the assumption that users did not have any special permissions
or authorizations set. Dependencies between tables and threat conditions were determined at an
attribute level to obtain the greatest level of detail in determining potential threats. The
simulation takes a pro-active approach in that users are allowed to access whatever information
they want to until the access has the potential for them to infer sensitive or confidential
information to which they do not have access. At that point, any transaction requests by the user
that have the potential to violate secure information will be rejected. The dependencies and
constraints that exist for the Payroll and generic schema are detailed below along with the threat
conditions that exist for the schemas, respectively.
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3. Schema Analysis
3.1 Payroll Schema
The Payroll schema used was designed in an effort to be as generic as possible and therefore
have similarities and applications similar to the Payroll data model of any typical organization or
company. The threat conditions that were determined assumed that the users accessing the
information did not have special permissions or qualifications such as being employees of the
HR department. Therefore, information that could be inferred about base pay, salary, etc. was
considered to be confidential. Any user requests that would allow either direct information or
information to be inferred regarding these details were rejected.
The schema of the Payroll Data Model is shown in Appendix A. A brief description of the
schema including the tables and their attributes are given below:
T1 – Employee
T2 – Position_Title
T3 – Employee_Salary
T4 – Pay_Period_Calendar
T5 – Employee_Pay_Adjustment
T6 – Adjustment_Type
In going through the process of determining the dependencies and constraints, the first step
involved creating the dependency matrix. The dependency matrix shows dependencies between
different tables as well as the constraints on such dependencies. For this project, dependencies
were considered at the attribute level in addition to the table level. As stated in Yaseen and
Panda’s paper, “all types of dependencies are observed at the table level since a table inherits the
dependencies present at its attribute levels, that is, a dependency between two tables is basically
a dependency between attributes that belong to them. Therefore, two tables may have more than
one type of dependency” [2].
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Because the table level is at the highest level of granularity, it is the easiest to construct. This
increased granularity is needed to express fully the relationships between attributes and also
provides a more realistic representation of queries. Often users access only the attributes they are
interested in seeing and do not view whole tables in a query. From this, the dependencies
between attributes among tables can be more easily constructed.
There are several dependency relationships that exist among attributes in a relational database
system. The two most common dependencies that will be discussed throughout this paper are
strong and weak dependencies. The definitions of these dependencies are taken from Yaseen and
Panda’s paper [2]. Two data items A and B have a dependency relationship between them if one
of them depends on the other or if they depend on each other. A dependency between A and B is
represented by the notation A→B, which means that B depends on A. A dependency relationship
is classified according to a number of categories, such as the strength, direction, and the
transitivity. The strength of a dependency relationship is classified into two types: weak and
strong, which are defined as follows.
Strong dependency: Given the dependency A→B, where A and B are two data items, if a change
in A results in a change in B, then it is a strong dependency.
Weak dependency: The dependency A→B is called weak, if a change in A may not result in a
change in B.
The values that are generated from establishing the dependencies and constraints among
attributes in the schema are taken as inputs in the actual simulation.
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The dependency matrix constructed for the payroll data model is shown below:
3.1.1 Dependency Matrix for Payroll Data Model
Table 1 Dependency Matrix for Payroll Schema

T1

T2

T3

T4

T5

T6

T1

-

0

(c1, 2)

0

(c2, 2)

0

T2

(c3, 2)

-

(c4, 2)

0

(c5, 1)

0

T3

0

0

-

0

(c6, 2)

0

T4

0

0

0

-

0

0

T5

(c9, 1)

(c10, 1)

(c11, 1)

0

-

0

T6

0

0

0

0

(c12, 2)

-

** The notation (cx, 1) indicates the constraint number and the degree of dependency. A value of
1 indicates a strong dependency while a value of 2 indicates a weak dependency. The
descriptions below correspond to the constraint values above.
3.1.2 Description of Constraints on Dependencies
(c1, 2) – Direct dependency; employee_id in Employee_Salary is a foreign key to employee_id in
Employee. Any changes to the job_title_code, marital_status_code, and dependents of Employee
will affect pay_period_id, net_pay, and gross_pay of Employee_Salary. Knowing the
marital_status will affect net_pay in Employee_Salary.
(c2, 2) – Direct dependency; employee_id in Employee_Pay_Adjustment is a foreign key to
employee_id in Employee. The adjustment_type_code and adjustment_amount will be affected
by pay_per_period, marital_status_code, and dependents. Knowing the marital_status will allow
information about adjustment_amount in Employee_Pay_Adjustment to be known.
(c3, 2) – Direct dependency; job_title_code in Employee is a foreign key to job_title_code in
Position_Title. The job_title_code and base_pay of Position_Title will affect the pay-per-period
of Employee. The job_title_code will only be useful if the job_title is known.

10

(c4, 2) – Transitive dependency; base_pay in Position_Title corresponds to gross_pay in
Employee_Salary.
(c5, 1) – base-pay of Position_Title will affect the adjustment_amount for taxes etc. in
Employee_Pay_Adjustment
(c6, 2) – The gross_pay of Employee_Salary will affect the Employee_Pay_Adjustment
(c9, 1) – Based on the adjustment_type_code, adjustment_amount, and adjustment_desc of
Employee_Pay_Adjustment, the marital_status, pay_per_period, and number of dependents of an
Employee can be determined.
(c10, 1) – Based on adjustment_amount due to tax brackets etc. of the
Employee_Pay_Adjustment, the base_pay and consequently the position of an individual can be
inferred.
(c11, 1) – The net_pay of Employee_Salary is affected by Employee_Pay_Adjustment
(c12, 2) – Direct dependency; adjustment_type_code in Employee_Pay_Adjustment is a foreign
key to adjustment_type_code in Adjustment_Type
3.1.3 Constraint and Dependency Graph
Based on the constraints determined, a set of attributes corresponding to threat conditions have
been constructed which outline sensitive information that will be revealed to unauthorized users
if all nodes of the graph are accessed.
For the purposes of the simulation, every attribute of the Payroll Data Schema has been
numbered as shown in Appendix B. These numberings provide the necessary information to run
the simulation that will create the knowledgebase of insiders and prevent any access to sensitive
information. Since it is assumed that the users do not have any previous special authorizations,
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they will not be allowed to execute any transactions that allow them to obtain corresponding
information to any of the threats listed above.
The format for listing the dependencies and constraints that reveal sensitive information is shown
below. This is what will be entered in the simulation to represent the schema and potential
threats.
Dependency Constraints on Sensitive Information
Condition 1: Base salary of an employee
Attributes: 1, 2, 10, 4, 5
Condition 2: Gross salary based on start date
Attributes: 1, 2, 10, 4, 5, 7
Condition 3: Number of dependents of a given employee
Attributes: 17, 22, 23, 10, 1, 4, 5, 8, 18
Condition 4: Net pay of an employee for a given month
Attributes: 17, 19, 10, 21, 16, 1, 4, 5, 20, 7
Condition 5: Marital status of employee
Attributes: 1, 4, 5, 3, 17, 18, 19, 22, 23
Total number of attributes for schema: 23
Additional Notes on Threat Conditions
Knowledge of the number of dependents can be used to determine the insurance amount for a
given individual.
Knowledge of the marital status of an individual will provide information about that person’s tax
bracket, which can be used in turn to infer the gross pay for that employee.
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3.2 Generic Schema
A generic schema was randomly generated after specifying values for the total number of
attributes and the number of threat conditions. The generic schema was generated as a sample
schema to compare simulation results against the Payroll Data Schema. The generic schema in
comparison to the Payroll Schema has only 12 attributes.
The dependency constraints for this schema are shown below:
Threat Attribute Values:
Condition 1: 1, 3, 5, 6, 7, 12
Condition 2: 2, 6, 7, 11, 12
Condition 3: 4, 5, 7, 1, 2, 9
In this paper, the simulations executed are similar for both the Payroll and the generic schema.
The only differences that occur are that the range of values tested change according to the size of
the schema. For instance, there is a smaller range set in the number of attributes accessed for a
given transaction in the generic schema, given the relatively small number of attributes.
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4. Simulation
4.1 Overview
The simulation has been designed in an effort to allow administrators to have a practical way to
apply the research done on predicting and preventing threats to identify the areas where threats
are most likely to occur. Based on this information, they can then provide access rights that give
users as much freedom as possible while maintaining the security of the system. The simulation
also provides an idea of how long it takes to obtain unauthorized knowledge of data items for
various types of relational database schemas and reveals which areas or conditions are most
susceptible to insider threat.
The simulation has been designed in such a way that it allows for multiple schemas to be run
and saved for further analysis. The simulation also allows multiple parameters to be changed for
testing purposes, including specifying the total number of attributes. Anyone using the
simulation has the option to change the number of users that execute transactions, determine the
number of overall transactions that are allowed, and specify a min and max for the number of
attributes that are accessed per given transaction. This is randomly generated based on the min
and max values specified.
The simulation can be accessed via the following link:
http://eventfinderbeta.com/InsiderThreat/publish.htm
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4.2 Screen Layout
4.2.1 Schema Entry
The schema entry tab allows users to provide details relating to the schema that they run the
simulations on. The user first enters the total number of attributes that are in the tables for a
given database schema. The attribute threat combination corresponds to the list of attributes
which if an insider without special permissions has access to, can reveal unauthorized sensitive
information. To provide the attribute threat combinations, all attributes for a given schema
should first be numbered. Based on the dependencies and constraints that exist, the attributes
which when aggregated provide sensitive information are then entered as shown below with each
threat condition corresponding to one line in the list box of the Insider Threat Schema.
Users are required to save the schema after entering it so that they do not have to re-enter the
schema when they want to run further simulations on the specified list of threat conditions.

Figure 1 Schema Entry Example
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4.2.2 Schema Loading
The saved schemas that were entered in the previous tab can then be opened in the Schema
Loading tab. The opened schema is displayed in order to make sure that the threat conditions
were as specified. The first line shows the total number of attributes and the threat conditions are
listed by comma separated values in the lines following. The value provided for the total number
of attributes is used to randomly generate transaction reads for users in the simulation. A schema
has to be opened and loaded before a user can proceed to execute either a single run simulation
or a multi run simulation.

Figure 2 Loading Schema Example
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4.2.3 Single Simulation
After the user specifies a schema to simulate, a single simulation run can be executed. The
following parameters namely, users, transactions, and a range for the number of attributes per
transaction need to be specified. The number of users that is provided is used to randomly
simulate the overall number of specified transactions. The number of attributes per transaction is
also randomly generated based on the given range. Therefore, as shown in the example below,
the total number of reads that occur for each transaction for any given user will access between 5
to 7 items. For the purposes of the simulation, we are only considering transaction with reads and
not writes to avoid dealing with additional complexities such as issues involving updates, etc.
which are beyond the scope of this paper.
When a single simulation is executed, the data grid on the left shows the overall knowledge base
of a given user based on accumulating the access information from all of the transactions for that
user. The data grid on the right shows the random simulation of the total number of transactions
distributed randomly across the number of users. The column labeled ‘Allowed’ shows whether a
given transaction was approved or rejected. If a transaction was rejected, the column labeled
‘Violates’, shows which threat condition was violated that prevented the transaction from
executing.

Figure 3 Example of Single Simulation Results
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4.2.4 Multi Simulation
The multi simulation takes the same parameters that are found in the single simulation, except
the multi simulation introduces additional complexity in allowing the three parameters to be
executed against each other with two variables changing via the x-axis and series while the third
variable remains constant. For instance, in the example below, the number of users is set to be x
axis changing in increments of 5 and ranging from 5 to 25. Transactions is set as the variable
manipulated through the series. In this example, the overall number of transactions is set to vary
from 50 to 200 in increments of 50. Finally, the third variable, the number of attributes per
transaction, is set as before ranging from 5 to 7. The text box labeled ‘Runs Per Data Point’ is
used to specify the number of executions for each given set of parameters. The average is taken
from all of the runs for a given set to obtain the greatest consistency and the most accurate
results. The results are expected because as the number of transactions increases for a given
number of users, the more likely that there will be more rejected transactions.

Figure 4 Example of Multi‐Simulation Run
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4.3 Example Simulation Runs
4.3.1 Single Run of Payroll Schema
The following data shows a single execution of the Threat Simulation Application in greater
detail using the Payroll Schema. The following parameters were specified in running the
simulation:
Users: 5
Transactions: 30
Items to be accessed per transaction: 5-7
The results generated in running the above simulation were as follows:
Table 2 Example of Transactions Executed Per User

User
2
2
5
5
4
3
2
1
3
3
2
3
5
4
2
2
4
5
4
5
2
5
3
2
5
3
3
2
4
3

Read
19 14 18 4 24
18 1 22 4 13
13 15 12 8 5 14
12 9 15 2 18
17 15 4 6 12 13
7 12 18 6 19 11
19 2 10 5 1
7 19 2 20 10
18 8 6 13 9
1 18 24 21 8
18 22 6 24 23 9
24 6 5 18 20
3 6 13 11 7 24
8 10 4 7 17 14
23 4 15 14 20 18
4 8 7 22 15 20
12 20 6 22 5
9 8 16 13 5 11
13 17 18 12 19 8
13 11 2 1 16 18
21 22 3 23 17 9
10 16 18 17 2
11 3 23 19 4
10 16 5 21 8
16 9 14 19 21 8
10 17 1 5 20 11
14 19 20 12 22 2
17 24 3 2 19 1
22 16 7 15 14
12 2 5 14 6

Allowed
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
N
Y
Y
N
Y
Y
N
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Violates

1

3

1

1

The knowledgebase of the users that was built as they read multiple transactions and accessed
more attributes is shown below:
Table 3 Example of User Knowledge Base

User: 1
User: 2
User: 3
User: 4
User: 5

2 7 10 19 20
1 2 3 4 6 7 8 9 13 14 15 17 18 19 20 21 22 23
1 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 17 18 19 20 21 23
4 5 6 7 8 10 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 22
1 2 3 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 21

The results show that sensitive information from threat condition 1 is the most likely to be
discovered through random access. This agrees with the constraints and dependencies imposed
on the payroll data model. Threat condition 1 is composed of only 5 attributes, indicating that
critical information can be obtained if access to all 5 attributes is obtained. The other threat
conditions require having knowledge of more than five attributes. Thus, threat conditions that
can only be obtained through the aggregation of information from several attributes have a lesser
likelihood of being violated through random accesses.
4.3.2 Number of Users versus Rejected Transactions
The Payroll schema and the generic schema were both simulated in multiple runs to determine
the number of rejected transactions while keeping the number of transactions the same and
changing the number of users. Multiple runs allowed the results to be compared across multiple
numbers of transactions executed.
The results of each run were obtained by taking the average of 100 runs per data point to ensure
consistency. The number of attributes accessed per transaction was held constant between the
range of 3 to 5 and were randomly generated among those values for every transaction in this
simulation run. The results for the Payroll Schema are shown below.
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Payroll Schema Number of Users vs. Rejected
Transactions
40

Rejected Transactions

35
30
25
50 Transactions

20

100 Transactions

15

150 Transactions

10

200 Transactions

5
0
5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

Users

Figure 5 Graph of Payroll Schema, Number of Users vs. Rejected Transactions

There is a correlation seen in the percentages of rejected transactions as the total number of
transactions increase relative to the number of users. For instance, the number of rejected
transactions for 5 users regardless of increasing the overall number of transactions was
approximately 1/6 of all transactions. Running 150 transactions for 5 users resulted in an average
of 23 rejected (23/150 = 15%) while running 200 transactions resulted in 34 rejected (17%).
A possible explanation for this is that once most of the information from the schema has been
added to the knowledge base, our criteria to reject any transaction, which will result in the
discovery of confidential information, results in one attribute from each threat condition being
excluded. This roughly corresponds to the total number of transactions that are rejected. Since
there were a total of 24 attributes for the payroll data schema with 4 threat conditions, (4/24 =
16%) provides a relatively accurate number of rejected transactions relative to the number of
transactions executed.
This information can be useful in creating a threshold value for user accesses to the database.
Given knowledge that 16% of transactions are rejected because sensitive information can be
21

obtained, users should be restricted to access only (100% - 16%) = 84% in random accesses to
ensure that they are not able to discover any sensitive information. The results for the generic
schema are shown below.

Generic Schema Number of Users vs.
Rejected Transactions
40
Rejected Transactions

35
30
25

25 Transactions

20

50 Transactions

15

75 Transactions

10

100 Transactions

5
0
5

10

15

20

25

30

Users
Figure 6 Graph of Generic Schema, Number of Users vs. Rejected Transactions

Generalizations that can be obtained in comparing the results using the generic schema to the
payroll data schema show that the fewer the number of users that access the database, the more
likely they are to obtain sensitive information quickly. This can be seen in Figure 6 where when
the number of users ranges between 5 and 15, a greater number of transaction requests are likely
to be rejected. This number evens out more as the number of transactions executed is increased
relative to the number of users.
4.3.3 Number of Transactions versus Rejected Transactions
Simulations were run to test changing the number of transactions while keeping the number of
users constant. The expected results were that it would be inverse of the above graphs for the two
schemas respectively. As before, the results of each run were obtained by taking the average of
100 runs per data point and the number of attributes accessed per transaction was randomly
generated between the range of 3 to 5. The results of running the simulation for the Payroll
Schema is shown below.
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Rejected Transactions

Payroll Schema Number of Transactions vs.
Rejected Transactions
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
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5 Users
20 Users
35 Users
50 Users
50

75

100
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200

Transactions

The results of running the simulation for the generic schema is shown below:

Rejected Transactions

Generic Schema Number of Transactions vs.
Rejected Transactions
15
10

5 Users
15 Users

5

25 Users
35 Users

0
25

30

35

40

45

50

Transactions
Figure 7 Graph of Generic Schema, Number of Transactions vs. Rejected Transactions

As expected, an analysis of the values showed that the simulations run comparing the number of
transactions to the overall number of rejected transactions had a direct inverse relationship to the
number of users and the number of rejected transactions. This can be understood intuitively that
as the number of transactions increases for a fixed number of users, the more likely they will
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develop their knowledgebase through random accesses and be more likely to request transactions
that will allow them to decipher confidential information.
4.3.4 Number of Items Accessed versus Rejected Transactions
A test simulation was run to determine if there was any correlation between the number of items
accessed at random within a given range to the number of rejected transactions overall. This
simulation was run, keeping all other parameters of the number of users vs. rejected transactions
the same except changing the range of the attributes accessed per transaction to 5-7 from 3-5.
The following graph was generated from running the simulation:

Rejected Transactions

Payroll Schema Attributes Accessed Per
Transaction vs. Rejected Transactions
60
50
40

50 Transactions

30

100 Transactions

20

150 Transactions

10

200 Transactions

0
5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

Attributes Accessed Per Transaction

Figure 8 Graph of Payroll Schema, Attributes/Transaction vs. Rejected Transactions

Comparing the results of the graph to the initial graph that had only 3-5 items accessed at
random per transactions showed that more transactions were rejected for the same number of
users and number of overall transactions when the number of data items accessed were between
the range of 5-7. This agrees with the premise that the more number of attributes that users are
allowed to access in a given transaction, the more likely they are to build up their knowledge
base at a faster rate and consequently increase their likelihood to determine sensitive
information.
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4.4 Query Simulation
A query simulation was developed that parses, analyzes, and accepts or rejects a user’s SQL
statement. Based on the existing knowledgebase of the user, the statement either executes and
returns the expected results or fails to execute if sensitive information can be obtained. If the
transaction request is allowed, it is passed to the database and the SQL statement is executed.
The results are displayed in the query simulation window. Thus far, SELECT is the only SQL
statement that is supported. Future developments may include support for update statements.
This provides a pro-active method to prevent any insider breaches of unauthorized information.
The query simulation works in a similar fashion to the single simulation and multi simulation in
that it builds up the knowledgebase of the user as access to data is provided. Transaction
execution is blocked if the fields requested can allow the user to infer any sensitive information.
The query simulation uses General SQL Parser, a commercially available SQL Parser that
identifies the attributes accessed in the SELECT and WHERE clauses of a SQL statement. The
current implementation uses SQL Server. At present, the query simulation is a prototype, but it
can be implemented as a network service, which would allow applications to access it rather than
merely providing a UI.
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4.4.1 Query Simulation Demonstration
The following shows a basic SELECT statement.
The results shown by the executed SQL statement show that there is no confidential information
that can be obtained thus far for the requested transaction.

Figure 9 Query Simulation Example 1
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The following diagram shows another SELECT statement. Note that the knowledgebase now
includes all of the attributes selected so far including those selected in the previous statement.

Figure 10 Query Simulation Example 2
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Given the knowledgebase being built up thus far, the following query results in the request being
rejected because sensitive information can be obtained. The transaction request is rejected
because based on the information obtained so far, the user can establish a relationship between a
given employee and their base pay which is strictly confidential.

Figure 11 Query Simulation Example 3
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5. Application
The simulation can be used in various ways to obtain useful information that can assist in
enhancing the security and avoiding malicious insider attacks in relational database systems.
Given a schema that has been broken down into various threat conditions, the simulation can be
used to determine how to grant permission rights that reveal minimal confidential information.
Moreover, having knowledge of threats that are most likely to be violated provides the system
administrator with information to identify the best balance between providing access to as much
data as possible and restricting the ability of users to infer unauthorized information.
At present, the simulation is pro-active to prevent insider threat before a breach occurs. Another
development would be to have the option of scanning through logs of a specific database to
develop the knowledgebase built up by users through their accesses. This can then be compared
against the input threat conditions for the schema to see which users could have accessed which
pieces of confidential information. If certain users did not have the authorization to such
information, permissions and restrictions could be put in place to ensure that they no longer had
access to the information.

29

6. Conclusion
An insider of a relational database system has been defined as “someone who has authorized
access, privileges or knowledge of the relational database system he/she uses, and is familiar
with the dependencies between data objects as well as the related mappings, and is motivated to
violate the security policy of the system through authorized access” [1]. The objective of the
paper by Yaseen and Panda was to provide a method that would allow insiders to perform their
tasks as efficiently as possible without having potential threats. In the case where insider threat
would be handled by extensively restricting permissions, the availability of information would be
limited and users would not be able to work as effectively or efficiently as possible. The
strategies and methods recommended in the paper stress the importance of prediction and
prevention which allow users to access as much information as they can until it interferes with
any sensitive information to which they do not have access.
Schemas are used under the assumption that attributes are far less likely to change on a frequent
basis and will thus provide a reliable source to generate dependencies and constraints. The
dependencies and constraints on dependencies that exist in a given schema can then be used to
generate the user’s knowledge graph which can be used to predict and prevent the threat that
insiders pose. The Threat Prediction Graph and an insider’s knowledge base that is built as the
user requests transactions can be used to determine a threshold value as to the maximum amount
of information a single insider can obtain regarding a given attribute. Once the threshold value is
reached or exceeded, a user can be blocked access pro actively or a warning can be issued to the
administrator to either revoke access or grant access to certain attributes.
At present, from Yaseen and Panda’s paper, it is possible to create the knowledgebase of a user.
That is given a list of what the user has permission to access, the knowledge base is constructed
using the Constraint and Dependency graph to track how much information about other attributes
can be inferred. This however, does not provide a calculation for the threat conditions that exist.
As discovered in going through the simulation, knowledge about critical items can be obtained
only through an aggregation of knowledge of different sets. The CDG cannot be obtained from
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the schema as the conceptual constraints cannot be determined without knowledge of the
business rules and the organization. A knowledge base can be built by a user based on inferences
that require knowledge of relationships that go beyond foreign key relationships, etc.
The simulation provides a practical application of the methodology proposed in Dr. Panda and
Qussai Yaseen’s paper and offers a pro active solution to predict and prevent the insider threat
problem in relational database systems. Generating the knowledge graph and knowledge base of
users allows the system to keep track of the amount of information obtained. Warnings can be
issued if insiders have the ability to infer values of data items to which they do not have
authorized access. The simulation demonstrates a model of how the threat prediction and
prevention solutions can be implemented for any database schema and consequently shows the
potential for application in industry.
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7. Appendix A
PAYROLL DATA MODEL

Position_Title

Employee
PK

employee_id

FK1

job_title_code
marital_status
first_name
last_name
gender
start_date
dependents

PK

job_title_code
base_pay
title

Employee_Salary
PK,FK1
PK,FK2

pay_period_id
employee_id
gross_pay
net_pay

Employee_Pay_Adjustment
PK,FK2
pay_period_id
PK,FK1
employee_id
PK,FK3,FK4 adjustment_type_code

Pay_Period_Calendar

adjustment_amount

PK

pay_period_id
pay_date

Adjustment_Type
PK

adjustment_type_code
adjustment_type_desc
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8. Appendix B
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